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Abstract
Process algebraic speciﬁcations of distributed systems are increasingly being targeted at identifying security
primitives well-suited as high-level programming abstractions, and at the same time adequate for security
analysis and veriﬁcation. Drawing on our earlier work along these lines [5], we investigate the expressive
power of a core set of security and network abstractions that provide high-level primitives for the speciﬁ-
cations of the honest principals in a network as well as the lower-level adversarial primitives that must be
assumed available to an attacker.
We analyze various bisimulation equivalences for security, arising from endowing the intruder with (i) diﬀer-
ent adversarial capabilities and (ii) increasingly powerful control on the interaction among the distributed
principals of a network. By comparing the relative strength of the bimimulation equivalences we obtain a
direct measure of the discriminating power of the intruders, hence of the expressiveness of the corresponding
models.
Keywords: Process algebras, bisimulation for security, intruder model
1 Introduction
The challenges in achieving security in distributed systems often create a tension
between two conﬂicting requirements. On the one side, security concerns call for
detailed formal speciﬁcations of the safeguards built against the threats to which the
systems are exposed. On the other side, programming the systems needs techniques
and reasoning methods that abstract away from such details to focus on the expected
functional properties.
In the literature on process calculi, this tension has generated a range of ap-
proaches, with two extremes. At one end, we ﬁnd speciﬁcations that draw on low-
level cryptographic primitives as in the spi calculus [3] or in the applied-pi calculus
[1]. At the other end lie speciﬁcations based on the pi calculus [11], which assume
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very abstract, and hard-to-implement, mechanisms to secure communications by
hiding them on private channels. A more recent line of research [2,9,4,6,7] follows a
diﬀerent approach, aimed at identifying security primitives well-suited as high-level
programming abstractions, and at the same time adequate for security analysis and
veriﬁcation in adversarial setting.
Drawing on our initial ideas in [5], in the present paper we further assess the
adequacy of our approach by investigating the expressive power of our security and
network abstractions. In particular, we analyze various bisimulation equivalences
for security, associated with a variety of intruder models. The models arise from en-
dowing the intruders with (i) diﬀerent adversarial capabilities and (ii) increasingly
powerful control on the interaction among the distributed principals of a network.
The bisimulation equivalences, in turn, provide a direct measure of the discrim-
inating power of the intruders, hence of the expressiveness of the corresponding
models.
The starting point is the asynchronous pi-calculus with security abstractions
we deﬁned in [5]. In this model, the intruder has the capability to interfere in
all network interactions: it can forge its own traﬃc, intercept all messages and
forward them back to the network, possibly replicating them. However, similarly
to what happens in the Dolev-Yao model for cryptographic protocols, it cannot
learn any secret message and cannot forge any authenticated transmission. For
this intruder, we give a sound characterization of strong barbed equivalence in
terms of strong asynchronous bisimulation. Also, we show that asynchronous and
synchronous bisimilarity coincide.
We then extend our network abstractions with a new primitive that enables the
intruder to silently eavesdrop on network traﬃc (without necessarily intercepting
it). We show that the new capability adds no discriminating power to the intruder,
in that it does not aﬀect the security equivalences (either synchronous or asyn-
chronous). On the other hand, eavesdropping turns out to be strictly less powerful
than intercepting.
As a further, and ﬁnal step, we look at the notion of intruder adopted in [4], that
corresponds to what is sometimes referred to as the man-in-the-middle intruder. In
this new model two principals may never engage in a synchronization directly as it is
customary for the semantics of traditional process calculi (and as we assume in the
initial model). Instead, all exchanges take place with the intruder’s intervention.
We show, somewhat surprisingly, that this additional control on the interactions
on the network does not change the notion of equivalence, hence does not add
discriminating power to the intruder.
Plan. Sections 2 and 3 review the calculus from [5]. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the
results for the Dolev-Yao intruder of [5]. Section 6 contrasts this model with the
man-in-the-middle intruder of [4]. Section 7 concludes the presentation.
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2 Security and Network Abstractions
We start with a brief review of the calculus of security and network abstractions
from [5]. We presuppose two countable sets N and V of names and variables,
respectively, and let a−q range over names, , w, x, y, z over variables and t, u, v over
N ∪ V. Names enable communication, but serve also as identities: for instance,
b〈a : n˜〉 indicates an output to b originating from a, while b(a : x˜) denotes an input
performed by b of a message from a. Tuples are indicated by a tilde, as in n˜, x˜, v˜.
2.1 High-Level Principals
The syntax of the high-level calculus is below.
H,K ::= u〈a : v˜〉◦ (Output)
| a(v : y˜)◦.H (Input)
| 0 (Null)
| H|K (Parallel)
| if u = v then H else K (Conditional)
| A〈u˜〉 (Deﬁnition)
| (νa)H (Restriction)
We use v as short for the name or variable v, or the distinguished name − associated
with an anonymous identity. The null, parallel composition and conditional forms
are just as in the pi-calculus. A〈u˜〉 is the process deﬁned by a (possibly recursive)
deﬁnition A(x˜) def= H (A may only occur guarded in H). The restriction (νa)H has
the familiar pi-calculus syntax but weaker scoping rules (see below). As to commu-
nication, we have four output forms, depending whether a is a or − and whether
◦ is • or the empty character, as explained next: u〈− : v˜〉 denotes a plain output,
a communication primitive that conveys no security guarantee; u〈a : v˜〉 denotes a
public, but authentic output, which certiﬁes the originator of the message, and en-
sures that the message cannot be replayed; u〈− : v˜〉• denotes a secret transmission,
providing guarantees that only the intended receiver will have access to the message
payload; ﬁnally, u〈a : v˜〉• denotes a secure transmission, combining the guarantees
of the authentic and secret modes. In sum, the secret outputs protect from message
disclosure, while authentic outputs protect against replication and forging. On the
other hand, an opponent may intercept all outputs, and then selectively forward
them back to the network.
The input forms have dual semantics: a(v : y˜)◦.H denotes an input, which
consumes a message sent on a from v or −, binding y˜ to the tuple of names that
form the payload. The input preﬁx is thus a binder for the variable y˜, whose scope
is H: instead, v must be instantiated at the time the input preﬁx is ready to ﬁre.
As for output, ◦ signals the secrecy mode and v the authenticity one. Inputs and
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outputs must agree on the transmission mode to synchronize.
Like in the local pi-calculus [10], we make a clear distinction between the input
and output capabilities for communication, and we disallow the transmission of the
former. Note, to this regard, that input preﬁxes are built around names (not vari-
ables) in the channel position. Similarly, we require a name in the sender position
of authentic messages. Taken together, these constraints guarantees that a process
H never gets to dynamically impersonate a new identity, in the following sense:
Deﬁnition 2.1 [Impersonation] A process H impersonates an identity a iﬀ H
uses a as the subject of a(u : y˜)◦.H, or as the source of an authentic (public or
secret) output, as in u〈a : v˜〉◦.
2.2 Networks and Intruders
Networks provide the low-level counterpart of the high-level calculus we just dis-
cussed. In addition, they make it possible to express the capabilities of an attacker.
The syntax is given below: within networks, names are partitioned into two sets Nt
and Nu of trusted and untrusted identities, respectively. By convention, we assume
that α-renaming respects this partition.
M,N,O ::= u〈a : v˜ ‖ t˜〉◦ (Low Output)
| a(u : y˜ ‖ z˜)◦.M (Low Input)
| 0 | M |N | A〈u˜〉 | (νa)N | if u = v then M else N
| †z(x : y˜ ‖ w˜)◦i .M (Intercept)
| !i (Forward/Replay)
The ﬁrst two productions introduce the network-level primitives for input and out-
put and are subject to the same restrictions about the use of names as in the
high-level syntax. The novelty is in the additional components t˜ of the output mes-
sages: these represent the network view of the payload, i.e. the view of the payload
given to an external observer of the message, and are bound to the variables z˜ in the
input preﬁx upon synchronization. The last two productions deﬁne the adversarial
primitives. The intercept preﬁx †z(x : y˜ ‖ w˜)◦i .M enables an adversary to intercept
all network messages. The preﬁx is a binder for the name i and all its component
variables, with scope M : intercepting the output b〈a : m˜ ‖ n˜〉◦ creates a copy of the
message indexed by the fresh name i and binds z to the target b, x to a and w˜ to n˜.
As to y˜, the binding depends on the secrecy mode of the message and on the trust
status of the identity b. In particular, if the message is secret and b ∈ Nt then y˜
gets bound to n˜, otherwise y˜ is bound to m˜. Notice (i) that intercepting a secret
message directed to a trusted principal does not break the secrecy of the payload,
and (ii) that a message can be intercepted even if it is directed to a restricted iden-
tity, as in (νb)b〈a : m˜ ‖ n˜〉◦. The cached copies of the intercepted messages may be
manipulated by way of the replay/forward form !i that uses the index i to forward
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a copy back to the network, or to produce a replica (in case the original messages
was not authenticated).
Deﬁnition 2.2 [Well-formed Networks] We say that plain output u〈− : v˜ ‖ t˜〉
is well-formed iﬀ v˜ = t˜; a secret/secure u〈a : v˜ ‖ t˜〉• or authentic u〈a : v˜ ‖ t˜〉 output
is well-formed iﬀ |v˜| = |t˜|. A network N is well-formed iﬀ it is closed (has no free
variable) and all of its outputs are well-formed.
The network view of a message depends on the transmission mode: it coincides with
the payload in plain outputs, while it is a fresh tuple of names in each authentic
and/or secret output. The correspondence between message formats is established
by the following translation of high-level principals H into their network level coun-
terparts [H ]. We only give the clauses for the communication forms (the remaining
clauses are deﬁned homomorphically). As discussed in [5], in a cryptographic im-
plementation, the chosen format may be realized by means of a time-dependent
signature, in an authentic message, and by a randomized encryption in a secret
output.
[u〈− : v˜〉]  u〈− : v˜ ‖ v˜〉
[u〈a : v˜〉]  (ν c˜)u〈a : v˜ ‖ c˜〉 (|v˜| = |c˜|)
[u〈a : v˜〉•]  (ν c˜)u〈a : v˜ ‖ c˜〉• (|v˜| = |c˜|)
[b(u : x˜)◦.H]  b(u : x˜ ‖ y˜)◦.[H] (|x˜| = |y˜| ∧ y˜ ∩ fv(H) = ∅)
The partition on the set of identities makes it possible to identify, within a network,
the trusted components from the intruder.
Deﬁnition 2.3 [Trusted processes vs Intruders] A network process N is
trusted iﬀ N ≡ [H], with H high-level principal, it only impersonates identities in
the set Nt and only creates fresh names in the same set. A network process N is an
opponent/intruder iﬀ it only impersonates identities in the set Nu and only creates
fresh names in the same set.
Throughout, we reserve the letters P and Q to range over the class of trusted
processes, and their run-time derivatives.
3 Barbed Equivalence
The dynamics of the calculus is given in Table 1 in terms of reduction and structural
congruence. To formalize the dynamics of networks, we need a special form to
represent the copies of the messages stored upon interception. We introduce the
new form below as part of what we call run-time network conﬁgurations:
M,N,O ::= . . . as in Section 2. . . | b〈a : m˜ ‖ c˜〉◦i
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Structural congruence
(Struct Par Comm) M |N ≡ N |M
(Struct Par Assoc) (N |N ′)|N ′′ ≡ N |(N ′|N ′′)
(Struct Par Zero) N |0 ≡ N
(Struct Res Zero) (νa)0 ≡ 0
(Struct Res Comm) (νa)(νb)N ≡ (νb)(νa)N
(Struct Res Par) M |(νa)N ≡ (νa)(M |N) when a ∈ fn(M)
(Struct Rec) A〈w˜〉 ≡ N{w˜/x˜} if A(x˜)
def
= N and |w˜| = |x˜|
(Struct If True) if a = a then M else N ≡ M
(Struct If False) if a = b then M else N ≡ N when a = b
(Struct Equiv) M ≡ M, M ≡ N implies N ≡ M,
N ≡ N ′ and N ′ ≡ N ′′ imply N ≡ N ′′
(Struct Cong) N ≡ N ′ implies (νn)N ≡ (νn)N ′ and N |N ′′ ≡ N ′ |N ′′
Reduction
In the (Intercept) rule i /∈ {b, a, m˜, c˜}, σ is the substitution {b/z, a/x, p˜/y˜, c˜/w˜}, and the p˜ are as follows:
if ◦ = • and b ∈ Nt then p˜ = c˜ else p˜ = m˜.
(Struct)
M ≡ M ′ M ′ −→ N ′ N ′ ≡ N
M −→ N
(Res)
N −→ N ′
(νa)N −→ (νa)N ′
(Par)
M −→ M ′
M |N −→ M ′|N
(Intercept) b〈a : m˜ ‖ c˜〉◦ | †z(x : y˜ ‖ w˜)i.N −→ (νi)(b〈a : m˜ ‖ c˜〉
◦
i | Nσ)
(Comm) b〈a : m˜ ‖ c˜〉◦ | b(a : y˜ ‖ z˜)◦.N −→ N{m˜/y˜, c˜/z˜}
(Forward) b〈a : m˜ ‖ c˜〉◦i | !i −→ b〈a : m˜ ‖ c˜〉
◦
(Replay) b〈− : m˜ ‖ c˜〉◦i | !i −→ b〈− : m˜ ‖ c˜〉
◦
i | b〈− : m˜ ‖ c˜〉
◦
Table 1
Reduction Semantics
The index i attached to the cached copy is associated univocally with the intercept
that created the copy, as shown in the (Intercept) rule. Notice, in the same rule,
that the bindings created depend on the structure and, more speciﬁcally, on the
secrecy of the intercepted message, as explained earlier on. As for the remaining
reductions, (Comm) is the usual synchronization rule, while (Forward) and (Reply)
formalize the semantics of the adversarial form !i. Notice in particular that a non-
authentic message is replicated, while an authentic one is not (the cached copy is
erased).
The semantics of the calculus is completed by a notion of contextual equality
based on reduction barbed congruence [8]. We ﬁrst deﬁne the observation predicate,
as usual in terms of barbs.
Deﬁnition 3.1 [Barb] We write N↓b whenever N ≡ (νn˜)(b〈. . . 〉◦|N ′) and b ∈ n˜
Deﬁnition 3.2 [Intruder Equivalence] A symmetric relation R on (run-time)
networks is (i) barb preserving if MRN and M ↓ b imply N ↓ b; (ii) reduction closed
if MRN and M −→ M ′ imply N −→ N ′ with M ′RN ′; (iii) contextual if MRN
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implies M |ORN |O for all (closed) intruder O and (νn˜)MR(νn˜)N for all names n˜
∈ Nu. Intruder equivalence I is the largest equivalence relation that is reduction
closed, barb-preserving and contextual.
Notice that we deﬁne observation in terms of strong bisimulation: this is a conse-
quence of the fact that all interactions occur on the network. Also note that we
restrict to adversarial contexts, as our intention is to ﬁnd a reasoning method specif-
ically targeted at the analysis of security-centric properties. Accordingly, we deﬁne
two processes equivalent if they cannot be distinguished by any opponent/intruder
that observes them and/or actively interacts with them, reading, intercepting, for-
warding and replaying the messages exchanged, or forging new ones.
4 Labelled transitions and bisimilarity
We give an alternative formulation of the semantics of networks, based on la-
belled transitions. The labelled transitions are organized in two sets. A ﬁrst set,
in Table 2, collects the transitions that correspond to the reduction semantics of
Section 3. In most cases the transitions are either standard, or constitute the direct
counterpart of the corresponding reductions in Table 1. The two (Output Inter-
cepted) transitions deserve more attention. First notice that, when the receiver is
trusted, the label exhibits diﬀerent information depending on the secrecy mode of
the output. Secondly, observe that the transitions leave in their residual a cached
copy of the message emitted: this reﬂects the eﬀect of an interaction with a sur-
rounding context that tests the presence of an output by intercepting it. A further
remark is in order on the diﬀerence between the two rules that govern scope extru-
sion. The diﬀerence is best understood if we take the view that a channel name
comprises the two identities of the end-points it connects: the source and the des-
tination. Under this interpretation the (Open) rule states that the channel name is
not extruded, as in the pi-calculus, while the (Open Intercepted) opens the scope
in accordance with the reduction semantics by which intercepting a message dis-
closes the identity of the receiver (as well of the sender) even though restricted.
The following, standard result connects the reductions with the silent actions in the
labelled transition semantics.
Lemma 4.1 (Harmony)
• If M
α
−→ M ′ and M ≡ N then N
α
−→ N ′ and M ′ ≡ N ′
• N −→ N ′ if and only if N
τ
−→ ≡ N ′.
A second set of labelled transitions, in Deﬁnition 4.2, provide the observable
counterpart of the labelled transitions of Table 2. They are obtained by the transi-
tions in in Table 2 by ﬁltering away all the transitions that involve the adversarial
forms (intercept and forward/reply) as well all the transitions that may not be ob-
served by an opponent by virtue of the restriction the opponent suﬀers on the use
of the trusted identities of a network.
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Common Transitions
(Input)
b(a : y˜ ‖ w˜)◦.N
b(a:m˜‖c˜)◦
−−−−−−−−→ N{m˜/y˜, c˜/w˜}
(Output)
b〈a : m˜ ‖ c˜〉◦
b〈a:m˜‖c˜〉◦
−−−−−−−−→ 0
(Secret Output Intercepted)
b ∈ Nt i /∈ {b, a, m˜, c˜}
b〈a : m˜ ‖ c˜〉•
(i)†b〈a:c˜‖c˜〉•
i
−−−−−−−−−−→ b〈a : m˜ ‖ c˜〉•i
(Output Intercepted)
b ∈ Nt or ◦ = • i /∈ {b, a, m˜, c˜}
b〈a : m˜ ‖ c˜〉◦
(i)†b〈a:m˜‖c˜〉◦
i
−−−−−−−−−−−→ b〈a : m˜ ‖ c˜〉◦i
(Open)
N
(p˜)b〈a:m˜‖c˜〉◦
−−−−−−−−−−→ N ′ n ∈ {m˜, c˜} − {b, a, p˜}
(νn)N
(n,p˜)b〈a:m˜‖c˜〉◦
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ N ′
(Open Intercepted)
N
(p˜,i)†b〈a:m˜‖c˜〉◦
i
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ N ′ n ∈ {b, a, m˜, c˜} − {p˜, i}
(νn)N
(n,p˜,i)†b〈a:m˜‖c˜〉◦
i
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ N ′
(Replay/Forward)
!i
〈i〉
−−→ 0
(Intercept)
†z(x : y˜ ‖ w˜)◦i .N
†b(a:p˜‖c˜)◦
i
−−−−−−−−→ N{b/z, a/x, p˜/y˜, c˜/w˜}
(Restr)
N
α
−→ N ′ n ∈ n(α)
(νn)N
α
−→ (νn)N ′
(Cond)
(a = b ∧M
α
−→ N) ∨ (a = b ∧M ′
α
−→ N)
if a = b then M else M ′
α
−→ N
(Par)
M
α
−→ M ′ bn(α) ∩ fn(N) = ∅
M |N,N |M
α
−→ M ′ |N,N |M ′
(Rec)
N{w˜/x˜}
α
−→ N ′ A(x˜)
def
= N
A〈w˜〉
α
−→ N ′
Intruder
(Synch)
M
(p˜)α
−−−→ M ′ N
α
−→ N ′ p˜ ∩ fn(N) = ∅
M |N
τ
−→ (νp˜)(M ′ |N ′)
(Co-replay)
b〈− : m˜ ‖ c˜〉◦i
(i)
−−→ b〈− : m˜ ‖ c˜〉◦i | b〈− : m˜ ‖ c˜〉
◦
(Co-forward)
b〈a : m˜ ‖ c˜〉◦i
(i)
−−→ b〈a : m˜ ‖ c˜〉◦
Table 2
Labelled Transition Semantics
Deﬁnition 4.2 [Observable LTS] We say that a network has an observable tran-
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sition, noted N 
α
−→ N ′, if and only if it may be derived by the following rules:
N
α
−→ N ′
N 
α
−→ N ′
α ∈
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
b(a : m˜ ‖ c˜)◦ a ∈ Nt
(p˜)b〈a : m˜ ‖ c˜〉◦ b ∈ Nt
†b(a : m˜ ‖ c˜)◦i , 〈i〉
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎭
The notions of synchronous and asynchronous bisimulation arise as expected
from the observable labelled transitions.
Deﬁnition 4.3 [Intruder Bisimularity] Let R be a symmetric relation over net-
works. R is a bisimulation if whenever MRN and M 
α
−→ M ′ with bn(α)∩fn(N) =
∅ there exists N ′ such that N 
α
−→ N ′ and M ′RN ′.
R is an asynchronous bisimulation if whenever MRN and M 
α
−→ M ′ with
bn(α) ∩ fn(N) = ∅ one has: (i) if α is not an input, then N 
α
−→ N ′ and M ′RN ′;
(ii) if α is an input, then N 
α
−→ N ′ and M ′RN ′ or N 
τ
−→ N ′ and M ′RN ′ |α.
Bisimilarity ∼ is the largest bisimulation, and asynchronous bisimilarity ∼a is
the largest asynchronous bisimulation.
By adapting the proof in [5] we can show that ∼a implies I . Hence ∼a is a sound,
purely coinductive, proof technique for I . In the next two theorems, we implicitly
assume processes to be derivatives of trusted processes.
Theorem 4.4 (Soundness) ∼a ⊆ I
A further, more interesting relationship exists between the asynchronous and syn-
chronous versions of bisimilarity. Indeed, the ability to intercept all traﬃc makes
asynchronous bisimilarity just as powerful as as synchronous bisimilarity.
Theorem 4.5 (Asynchronous vs synchronous Bisimilarity) ∼a = ∼
Proof sketch. Clearly ∼ ⊆ ∼a because, by deﬁnition, a synchronous bisimulation
is also an asynchronous bisimulation. To prove the reverse inclusion, we show that
R = {(P,Q) | P ∼a Q} is a bisimulation. The crux of the proof is to show
that whenever P ∼a Q, the input actions by P (resp. Q) may always be matched
by corresponding input actions by Q (resp. P ). We give the outline, leaving the
somewhat elaborate details to the full version of the paper.
Assume P 
β
−→ P ′ and let β be an input action. Then Q may match this move by
a τ transition: however, this transition is not entirely silent, because, to make the
τ step, Q must emit an output, which can be intercepted, hence observed, by the
environment. Let then Q′ be the process reached by Q via the output (intercepted)
transition. Since P ∼a Q, P must have a corresponding transition to a P
′ ∼a Q
′.
At this stage, we still have P ′ 
β
−→ P ′′ for some P ′′, and we can repeat the same
reasoning we just made, now on Q′ rather than Q. The reasoning may be repeated
only a ﬁnite number of times, unless P and Q have inﬁnitely many outputs ready
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to ﬁre, which cannot happen, as replication, and recursion, may only occur guarded
in our processes. Thus, after a ﬁnite number of steps, it must be the case that Q
responds to the β transition by P with a corresponding β transition. The proof
follows by showing that, indeed, Q may respond to the input action at the very ﬁrst
step, as the input action β commutes with all the intervening outputs involved in
the bisimulation game we just illustrated. 
The proof breaks if we lift the restriction that recursion be guarded: indeed, not
only the proof breaks, but the result itself is false. Here is a counter-example. Let
∗R denote the replicated version of R, deﬁned by the unguarded recursive deﬁnition
∗R
def
= ∗R | R. Consider
P
def
= ∗ a〈− : m〉 | ∗ a(− : x).a〈− : x〉 | b(− : x).b〈− : x〉
Q
def
= ∗ a〈− : m〉 | ∗ a(− : x).a〈− : x〉
Clearly P ∼ Q, because there is no way for Q to match the input transition
available for P on b. On the other hand, the two processes cannot be distinguished
in the asynchronous version of -bisimilarity as P ’s move on b, P
b(−:n)
−−−−→ Q | b〈− : n〉,
may be matched by Q via a τ -transition that takes Q back to itself (thanks to the
presence of the replicated output).
The result breaks similarly in the presence of a choice operator P1 + P2, with
the usual semantics P1 +P2
α
−→ P ′ if P1
α
−→ P ′ or P2
α
−→ P ′. The counterexample
is given by the following processes, where a(− : x)∗ denotes the guarded recursive
process Q
def
= a(− : x).Q.
P ′
def
= a(− : x)∗ | (a〈− : x〉 + b(− : x).b〈− : x〉)
Q′
def
= a(− : x)∗ | a〈− : x〉
Clearly P ′ ∼ Q′, because there is no way for Q′ to match the input transition
available for P ′ on b. On the other hand, the two processes cannot be distinguished
in the asynchronous version of bisimilarity as P ′
b(−:n)
−−−−→ a(− : x)∗ | b〈− : x〉, may
be matched by Q′
τ
−→ a(− : x)∗.
5 Eavesdroppers
We continue our analysis on the strength of our security abstractions by extending
the set of adversarial forms to include an eavesdrop primitive.
M,N ::= . . . (as in Section 2) . . . | ?z(x : y˜ ‖ w˜)◦i .M
Like the intercept preﬁx, ?z(x : y˜ ‖ w˜)◦i .M is a binder for the name i and for all of its
component variables, with scope M . The semantics is given in Table 3: the reduc-
tions and labelled transitions follow the exact same rationale as the corresponding
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Reduction: as in the intercept rules, σ is the substitution {b/z, a/x, p˜/y˜, c˜/w˜}, and the p˜ are as follows:
if ◦ = • and b ∈ Nt then p˜ = c˜ else p˜ = m˜. Moreover, in the (Eavesdrop) rule, i /∈ {b, m˜, c˜}.
(Eavesdrop Auth) b〈a : m˜ ‖ c˜〉◦ | ?z(x : y˜ ‖ w˜)◦i .N −→ b〈a : m˜ ‖ c˜〉
◦ | (νi)Nσ
(Eavesdrop) b〈− : m˜ ‖ c˜〉◦ | ?z(x : y˜ ‖ w˜)◦i .N −→ b〈− : m˜ ‖ c˜〉
◦ | (νi)(b〈− : m˜ ‖ c˜〉◦i | Nσ)
Labelled Transitions:
(Output Eavesdropped)
b ∈ Nt or ◦ = • i /∈ {b, m˜, c˜}
b〈− : m˜ ‖ c˜〉◦
(i)?b〈−:m˜‖c˜〉◦
i
−−−−−−−−−−−→ b〈− : m˜ ‖ c˜〉◦i | b〈− : m˜ ‖ c˜〉
◦
(Output Eavesdropped Auth)
b ∈ Nt or ◦ = • i /∈ {b, a, m˜, c˜}
b〈a : m˜ ‖ c˜〉◦
(i)?b〈a:m˜‖c˜〉◦
i
−−−−−−−−−−−→ b〈a : m˜ ‖ c˜〉◦
(Secret Output Eavesdropped)
b ∈ Nt i /∈ {b, m˜, c˜}
b〈− : m˜ ‖ c˜〉•
(i)?b〈−:c˜‖c˜〉•
i
−−−−−−−−−−−→ b〈− : m˜ ‖ c˜〉•i | b〈− : m˜ ‖ c˜〉
•
(Secret Output Eavesdropped Auth)
b ∈ Nt i /∈ {b, a, m˜, c˜}
b〈a : m˜ ‖ c˜〉•
(νi)?b〈a:c˜‖c˜〉•
i
−−−−−−−−−−−→ b〈a : m˜ ‖ c˜〉•
(Open Eavesdropped)
N
(p˜,i)?b〈a:m˜‖c˜〉◦
i
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ N ′ n ∈ {b, a, m˜, c˜} − {p˜, i}
(νn)N
(n,p˜,i)?b〈a:m˜‖c˜〉◦
i
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ N ′
(Eavesdrop)
?z(x : y˜ ‖ w˜)i.N
?b(a:p˜‖c˜)◦
i
−−−−−−−−→ N{b/z, a/x, p˜/y˜, c˜/w˜}
Table 3
Semantics of Eavesdropping
rules for the intercept primitive, with the diﬀerences (i) that eavesdropping does
not consume the output, and hence (ii) that it does not create a copy in case the
output is authentic.
In the rest of this section we analyze the import of eavesdropping on the dis-
criminating power of the intruder. In that direction we let (∼κ)κ⊆{†,?,!} denote the
family of bisimilarity relationships associated with the corresponding set of adver-
sarial primitives. Similarly, we deﬁne the set (∼κa)κ⊆{†,?,!} for the asynchronous
setting, and look at the relative strength of (some of) the equivalences in these sets.
Our ﬁrst result shows that eavesdropping does not give any additional discrim-
inatory power.
Theorem 5.1 ∼†!a = ∼
†?!
a , and similarly ∼†! = ∼†?!.
Proof sketch. Clearly, ∼†?!a ⊆ ∼
†!
a . For the reverse inclusion, we show that eaves-
dropping can be encoded in terms of intercept and forward/reply. The same tech-
nique applies in the proof for the synchronous relationships. 
Next, we show that eavesdropping is strictly less powerful than intercepting.
Theorem 5.2 ∼†!a  ∼?!a and similarly ∼
†!  ∼?!.
Proof sketch. Clearly ∼†?!a ⊆ ∼?!a , which implies ∼
†!
a ⊆ ∼?!a by Theorem 5.1 above.
The exact same reasoning applies in the synchronous case. That the inclusions
are strict follows by the following counter-example, which applies uniformly to the
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Reductions:
(Forward) b〈a : m˜ ‖ c˜〉◦i | !i | b(a : y˜ ‖ z˜).N −→ N{m˜/y˜, c˜/z˜}
(Replay) b〈− : m˜ ‖ c˜〉◦i | !i | b(− : y˜ ‖ z˜).N −→ b〈− : m˜ ‖ c˜〉
◦
i | N{m˜/y˜, c˜/z˜}
Labelled Transitions
(Co-replay)
N
b(−:m˜‖c˜)◦
−−−−−−−−→ N ′
b〈− : m˜ ‖ c˜〉◦i |N
(i)∗
−−−→ b〈− : m˜ ‖ c˜〉◦i | N
′
(Co-forward)
N
b(a:m˜‖c˜)◦
−−−−−−−−→ N ′
b〈a : m˜ ‖ c˜〉◦i | N
(i)∗
−−−→ N ′
Table 4
Man-in-the-middle reductions and labelled transitions
synchronous and asynchronous cases. Let a ∈ Nt, and take the following two
processes:
P
def
= a〈− : m〉 | a〈− : m〉 | ∗ a(− : x).a〈− : x〉
Q
def
= a〈− : m〉 | ∗ a(− : x).a〈− : x〉
P and Q are easily distinguished by using the intercept preﬁx to count the outputs
in the two processes. On the other hand, P ∼?! Q as this counting in not possible
for an eavesdropper, because (i) eavesdropping does not consume the messages, and
(ii) a is a trusted name, hence the intruder cannot impersonate a to input on a. 
6 Men in the middle
We continue our analysis by looking at the intruder model adopted in [4], which
we adapt to our calculus. In this new model, two principals may never engage
in a synchronization directly as in our initial semantics in Section 3. Instead, all
exchanges require the mediation of the intruder which intercepts all outputs and
then delivers them to the processes in the exact moment they are ready to consume
them. As a result, the reduction relation arises from the relation deﬁned in Table 1
by dropping the (Comm) rule and by replacing the (Forward) and (Replay) rules
with two rules in Table 4.
A corresponding modiﬁcation is required on the labelled transition semantics to
mimic the form of three-way synchronization induced by the new rules of reduction.
In particular, the new labelled transitions arise from those deﬁned in Table 2 by (i)
replacing the rules (Co-reply) and (Co-forward) with the two rules in Table 4, and
(ii) by dropping the (Synch) rule in when α and α are input and output actions,
respectively (thus eﬀectively disabling direct synchonization between trusted pro-
cesses). The observable LTS for the new semantics is derived exactly as we did in
Deﬁnition 4.2. We let
∗
∼ be the bisimilarity relationship associated with the new
LTS: notice that, having disabled all τ -actions on trusted processes, the relations
of asynchronous and synchronous bisimilarity on trusted processes collapse to the
same relation
∗
∼.
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At a ﬁrst look, the new equivalence
∗
∼ would appear ﬁner than ∼ due to the
tighter control the new intruder can exercise over the interaction between the prin-
cipals of a network. As it turns out, however, this additional control does not add
any discriminating power.
Theorem 6.1 On trusted processes,
∗
∼ = ∼.
Proof sketch. We prove the two inclusions separately, by coinduction. The in-
clusion
∗
∼ ⊆ ∼ is subtle, as we need to identify the ‘right’ pairs of run-time pro-
cesses to be included in the candidate relation. In that direction, we deﬁne pro-
cesses P and Q cache-consistent iﬀ P ≡ (ν p˜)(Pˆ | b〈a : m˜ ‖ c˜〉◦i ) if and only if
Q ≡ (ν q˜)(Qˆ | b〈a : m˜′ ‖ c˜〉◦i ), with m˜ = m˜
′ whenever ◦ = • or b ∈ Nt. Now we deﬁne
the relation
R = {(P,Q) | P
∗
∼ Q and P,Q are cache-consistent}
and show that R is a ∼-bisimulation. This is enough to prove the claim because
any two trusted processes are trivially cache-consistent (they have no cached copies).
The proof shows that re-emitting a cached message when no process is ready to input
it does not given any discriminating power. It derives from the following closure
property for
∗
∼ under the co-reply/co-forward transitions 
(i)
−−→ from the original
system:
Let P and Q be cache-consistent processes. If P
∗
∼ Q and P 
(i)
−−→ P ′ then
Q 
(i)
−−→ Q′ and P ′
∗
∼ Q′.
The reverse implication follows by coinduction, using the relation
R = {(P,Q) | P ∼ Q}
The subtlety here is to show that whenever P ∼ Q and P consumes a forward
or a replica of a cached message, then the same must happen on Q. Again, this
is a consequence of the discriminating power provided by intercept: were Q not
to respond as expected, an observer would be able to tell Q from P based on the
presence of an output that cannot be observed in P . 
The hypothesis that P and Q be trusted processes (hence cache-consistent) is
crucial for the proof. Indeed, the theorem is false for arbitrary run-time conﬁg-
urations. For instance b〈− : m ‖ m〉i
∗
∼ 0, as neither process has any transition;
on the other hand, clearly, b〈− : m ‖ m〉i ∼ 0 as the process on the left has an
(i)-transition, while 0 clearly has not.
7 Conclusions
We have investigated a core set of abstractions for distributed communication, and
assessed their adequacy for security veriﬁcation by analyzing their interplay with a
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class of diﬀerent intruder models. Our results show that the abstractions are robust,
in that the observational equivalences they yield are preserved under the diﬀerent
observations available with the diﬀerent adversarial primitives and interaction mod-
els which we have considered.
In its present form, the framework is targeted at secrecy and authentication.
Future work includes expending it to account for more advanced properties required
in modern network applications such as e-commerce protocols and electronic voting.
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